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DETECTING STRUCTURE IN ACTIVITY SEQUENCES: EXPLORING THE HOT HAND 
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Joseph Houpt 
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 Can humans discriminate whether strings of events (e.g., shooting success 
in basketball) were generated by a random or constrained process (e.g., hot and 
cold streaks)? Conventional wisdom suggests that humans are not good at this 
discrimination. For example, Kahneman (2011) writes that “the hot hand is 
entirely in the eye of the beholders, who are consistently too quick to perceive 
order and causality in randomness. The hot hand is a massive and widespread 
cognitive illusion” (p. 117). Following from Cooper, Hammack, Lemasters, and 
Flach (2014), a series of Monte Carlo simulations and empirical experiments 
examined the abilities of both humans and statistical tests (Wald-Wolfowitz Runs 
Test and 1/f) to detect specific constraints that are representative of plausible 
factors that might influence the performance of athletes (e.g., learning, non-
stationary task constraints). 
 
 Cooper, Hammack, Lemasters, and Flach’s (2014) research showed that various types of 
constraints on binary sequences (illustrated in Figure 1) could be reliably detected by both 
humans and statistical tests. This study examined both statistical tests and human performance on 
a success dependent learning constraint that was calibrated to reflect shooting percentages 
representative of shooting in NBA games. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Types of constraints on binary sequences. 
 
 
Note. This diagram illustrates four types of processes as a function of whether the generating 
rules are independent and stationary.  
 
Table 1. 
Monte Carlo simulation results. 
 
 
 
Note. * p < .05 for two-tailed z-test for runs; * p < .05 for one-tailed t-test for slope (beta). N = 
512 and N = 800 indicate that the beginning 512 and 800 (respectively) data points from the 
1024 data point sequence were used. Includes the overall mean performance (percent success), 
the results of the Wald-Wolfowitz Runs Tests across sample sizes, and the mean slopes (betas) 
and one-tailed t-test results from the spectral analysis across sample sizes. 
 
Table 2. 
Monte Carlo simulation results for the performance dependent learning constraint. 
 
 
 
Note. * p < .05 for two-tailed z-test for runs; * p < .05 for one-tailed t-test for slope (beta). B.512 
and B.800 indicates the beginning 512 and 800 data points, M.800 indicates the middle 800 data 
points, and E.800 indicates the end 800 data points from the 1024 data point sequence. Empirical 
Experiment used trials generated with initial p(hit) = 0.33, asymptotic p(hit) = 0.61, and k = .005. 
Includes the overall mean performance (percent success), the results of the Wald-Wolfowitz 
N = 512 N = 800 N = 1024
Mean SD |Z| |Z| |Z| Mean SD t Mean SD t
p(hit) = 0.3 0.306 0.013 0.04 0.18 0.44 0.02 0.06 0.87 0.02 0.04 1.50
p(hit) = 0.5 0.500 0.018 0.26 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 1.94 0.01 0.06 0.26
p(hit) = 0.8 0.806 0.009 0.62 0.57 0.05 -0.05 0.06    -2.58 * -0.01 0.07 -0.63
0.419 0.018 3.04 * 3.87 * 4.18 * -0.23 0.07  -10.75 * -0.25 0.07 -11.93 *
0.408 0.014 1.81 2.18 * 3.08 * -0.15 0.09  -5.15 * -0.18 0.07 -8.54 *
0.401 0.014 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.11 0.01 0.05 0.62
0.498 0.020 8.89 * 11.10 * 12.67 * -0.55 0.12  -14.73 * -0.56 0.08 -23.54 *
0.422 0.034 3.66 *  4.40 * 5.11 * -0.26 0.05  -15.46 * -0.26 0.07 -11.39 *
k = 0.001 0.292 0.011 0.84 2.54 * 3.79 * -0.05 0.07  -2.30 * -0.08 0.04 -6.94 *
k = 0.003 0.556 0.015 3.10 * 4.68 * 5.70 * -0.14 0.08  -5.71 * -0.10 0.05 -6.72 *
k = 0.005 0.642 0.008 4.04 * 5.33 * 5.74 * -0.14 0.05  -9.33 * -0.08 0.04 -6.41 *
0.391 0.022 1.98 * 2.64 * 3.18 * -0.16 0.05  -10.23 * -0.13 0.05 -8.28 *
Quadrant 3
Quadrant 1
Bernoulli Processes
Quadrant 2
p(hit) = 0.2 and p(hit) = 0.6
10% chance of alternation
25% chance of alternation
50% chance of alternation
Runs Test
N = 1024
Frequency Analysis Beta Slope
N = 512N = 1024
Simple Learning Curve and p(hit) +/-10%
k = 0.002 +/-10%
Shot Dependencies
Last 1 shot dependency
Last 5 shot dependency
Simple Learning Curves
Quadrant 4
Frequency Analysis Beta Slope Frequency Analysis Beta Slope
N = B.512N = B.800N = M.800N = E.800 N = 1024 N = 512 N = 1024
Mean SD |Z| |Z| |Z| |Z| |Z| Mean SD t Mean SD t
Performance Dependent Learning Curves
k = 0.001 0.380 0.019 0.19 0.16 0.48 0.51 0.40 -0.01 0.08 -0.35 -0.03 0.06 -1.37
k = 0.003 0.459 0.022 0.33 0.64 0.48 0.30 0.66 -0.03 0.07 -1.15 -0.03 0.06 -1.60
k = 0.005 0.499 0.020 0.33 0.48 0.24 0.48 0.75 -0.05 0.06  -2.37 * -0.02 0.05 -1.64
k = 0.001 0.273 0.013 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.35 -0.01 0.08 -0.40 -0.02 0.07 -0.80
k = 0.003 0.425 0.016 0.41 1.17 0.92 1.07 2.10 * -0.03 0.08 -1.35 -0.03 0.06 -1.86
k = 0.005 0.529 0.022 1.31 3.11 * 2.56 * 1.81 4.09 * -0.11 0.06 -5.63 * -0.09 0.05 -5.53 *
 p(hit) = 0.33 and p(hit) = 0.61
 p(hit) = 0.20 and p(hit) = 0.80
Quadrant 3
Runs Test
N = 1024
 
Runs Tests across sample sizes, and the mean slopes (betas) and one-tailed t-test results from the 
spectral analysis across sample sizes.  
 
Method for Human Judgment Task 
 
 Participants participated in 3 blocks of thirty trials each. In each trial participants were 
presented with sequences representing binary strings of basketball shots (successes and misses) 
and were asked to discriminate between two possible generators. In the experiment participants 
were asked to discriminate between a sequence generated by either a Bernoulli process (a 
‘steady’ shooter with a constant p(hit) = 0.44) or an alternative process governed by a 
performance dependent learning constraint with a learning rate = .005, a starting p(success) = 
0.33, and an asymptote at p(success) = 0.61. Eight hundred shots were available to participants 
on each trial, however, the number of shots that could be viewed simultaneously decreased from 
16 on Block 1 to 1 on Block 3. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Table 3. 
Empirical experiment results. 
 
 
Note. Mean percentage rate of hits and false alarms, adjusted d’, and bias value as a function of 
window size. Mean and Standard Deviation (SD) were taken across participants. 
 
 For the Monte Carlo simulations, constrained by performance dependent learning, the 
Wald-Wolfowitz Runts Tests and spectral analysis (1/f) showed that none of the sequences used 
for the empirical experiment were detected as being significantly different from what would be 
expected from a Bernoulli generated process (with the exception of the spectral analysis using 
the weakest sample size (N = 512)). Nonetheless, there was information available in the 
sequences to discriminate between the two generating models as indicated by a Bayes Factor 
comparisons between the models fit to the generated sequences. However, when the same 
simulation data was used in a discrimination task done by humans, the results indicated that they 
were able to discriminate the Bernoulli generated sequences from the alternatively constrained 
performance dependent learning sequences significantly better than chance.  
 Conventional wisdom classifies the hot hand as an ‘illusion’ and adds it to the collection 
of other biases (e.g., gambler’s fallacy, availability, representativeness, etc.). However, there is 
an alternative perspective on human reasoning that has roots in early functional/pragmatic 
approaches to human cognition. For example, Peirce (1877/1997) offered the construct of 
abduction as an alternative to classical logic. Abduction is an approach to rationality that is 
grounded in the practical success of beliefs, rather than in the syntax of arguments. More 
recently, an ecological rationality has been advocated by Gigerenzer (e.g., Todd and Gigerenzer, 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
0.64 0.03 0.33 0.05 0.82 0.17 0.04 0.09
0.67 0.03 0.31 0.05 0.96 0.16 0.03 0.08
0.61 0.04 0.34 0.03 0.70 0.13 0.06 0.07
Hit Rate Bias Value
Window = 16
Window = 4
Window = 1
False Alarm Rate Adjusted d'
 
2012). From the perspective of Ecological Rationality, heuristics are considered to be analogous 
to Runeson’s construct of smart instrument. That is, the use of heuristics reflects an attunement 
to structure (invariants) in natural ecologies. Thus, it may be an example of an abductive form of 
rationality that leverages constraints in the problem ecology in ways that support successful 
adaptations. Thus the belief in the hot hand seems like an effective adaptive strategy rather than 
neglect of probability theory.  
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